


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The President's Daily Brief

January 4, 1975

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
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh Area



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CAMBODIA

Government troops have recaptured territory on both banks of the Mekong near Phnom Penh and along Route 4 southwest of the capital since the communists launched their offensive on New Year's Day.

Reports that the government had abandoned the military fuel depot at Prek Pnou have proved false. Cambodian forces still control the depot and are holding the garrison against continued communist attacks. Government clearing operations along Route 5 just north of the fuel depot, however, continue to meet stiff resistance and the road there remains cut. The government's 7th Division has made some progress in clearing a secondary road west of the fuel depot and in relieving some isolated units.

Intercepted communications from unidentified insurgent forces near Phnom Penh indicate that the communists plan terrorist action inside the city against government personnel and offices, military facilities, and marketplaces. While the insurgents could carry out some limited terrorist action in the city, the scope of action outlined in the message would seem to be beyond them.

Elsewhere in the country, insurgent forces have increased their holdings along the Mekong River corridor. The river remains open, but resupply convoys will be vulnerable unless government units are able to retake some of the lost terrain. The next convoy is scheduled to transit the Mekong from South Vietnam on January 7.

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IRAN-EGYPT-JORDAN

The Shah's state visits to Egypt and Jordan next week will be the latest steps in his effort to improve ties with moderate and conservative Arab countries. He has already wooed the Arabs by giving more lip service to the Arab cause against Israel. The Shah hopes that the trip will demonstrate his constructive, moderating influence in regional politics and help isolate radical regimes such as Iraq's.

The visit to Egypt is the Shah's first state visit there. Relations between the two countries were chilly during Nasir's tenure, but have warmed under Sadat. Both governments now favor limiting the influence of radical Arab regimes and hope to restrict the role played in the region by outside powers. The Shah and Sadat want to develop areas of mutual interest;

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Both sides have gained from closer relations. Sadat has endorsed the Shah's attempts to foster closer economic and security cooperation among Indian Ocean countries and has acquiesced in Iran's growing role in Persian Gulf security affairs. Cairo has also ignored Iraqi requests that it protest Iran's military support for the Kurds.

For its part, Cairo looks to Tehran mainly for economic help. Last May the Shah agreed to provide \$870 million to support various Egyptian economic projects, including rebuilding Port Said. Tehran has also agreed to furnish 3 million tons of Iranian crude oil, but is still unwilling to give Cairo military equipment or money to purchase arms.

As for Jordan, the Shah has maintained good relations with King Husayn over the years. Iran loaned Jordan \$15 million last year and delivered 11 F-5 jet fighters; another 11 will be delivered in 1975. Tehran has also provided flight training to Jordanian pilots. Both countries provide military aid to the Sultan of Oman for his fight against the leftist rebellion there.

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RHODESIA


Prime Minister Smith's truce agreement with black insurgent leaders appears to be taking effect gradually. Prospects are dim, however, for the early constitutional conference called for in the agreement.

Since Smith announced the truce on December 11, the government has released at least 50 of some 400 black political detainees. The government claims, however, that the insurgents are responsible for a number of recent small-scale attacks on farmers and security patrols, and Smith reportedly has informed Rhodesian nationalist leaders that captured guerrillas will be set free only after all political detainees are released. This enables him to hold the guerrillas hostage until terrorist incidents cease.

Smith and the black nationalists have been unable to agree on a site for the projected constitutional conference. The nationalists are opposed to Smith's plan to hold it in Salisbury, where they fear he would preside and play them off against each other. There are serious rivalries in the nationalist movement; three insurgent groups, for example, maintain separate offices in Lusaka, the capital of neighboring Zambia.

When British Foreign Secretary Callaghan visited Lusaka this week on his tour of six black African capitals, Zambian President Kaunda reportedly urged him to convene the constitutional conference in London. Bishop Muzorewa, the chairman of the Rhodesian African National Council, and the principal insurgent leaders also favor the London site. Smith is likely to resist such an arrangement. Callaghan is also going to South Africa today to consult with Prime Minister Vorster on the Rhodesian problem.

Disposition of Soviet Naval Forces



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SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS

We present below the principal judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Naval Policy and Programs, which was approved by the Intelligence Community on December 23, 1974.

A primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to furnish a deterrent to attack through the presence of a credible and survivable SSBN (ballistic missile nuclear submarine) force, and, in time of general war, to participate in the nuclear exchange and strike at soft targets such as military installations, industries and government centers.

The Soviets routinely maintain five of their operational SSBNs on station. The Soviets also appear to keep [redacted] SSBNs ready for deployment [redacted] the majority of these-- the Y-class SSBNs--will take about a week to ten days to reach station after notice. This will change appreciably during the next decade since increasing numbers of D-class submarines will be within missile range upon leaving home port.

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Under conditions of sufficient warning to get additional forces to firing stations, the Soviets might currently expect as many as 400 sea-based missiles to reach their targets in an initial strike. Under conditions of no warning, successful NATO damage limiting operations, delays in command and control procedures, or deliberate Soviet decisions, the Soviets might be able to launch only a few score missiles from the Y-class and D-class SSBNs.

The Soviets are attempting to increase the survivability of their SSBN force in several ways. They are constructing tunnels near SSBN bases suitable for concealment and protection of the submarines and have built dummy SSBNs probably to conceal deployment levels during crises or to mislead NATO targeting.

We expect the Soviet SSBN force to expand to 62 modern units by the late 1970s. The 62nd unit is probably already under construction, and we believe all of them will be completed.

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If the proposed strategic arms limitation agreement covering the 1977-1985 period is successfully concluded, the Soviets will be limited to a total of 2,400 delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), and intercontinental bombers--with no sublimit on SLBMs. This would require some reductions in the numbers and probably some changes in the mix of Soviet strategic forces.

We believe the Soviets will retain a force at the level of 62 modern SSBNs until about 1980. But pressures will mount for change in the mix of strategic forces in the 1980s and we are uncertain how these will affect the SSBN force.

An extensive program to refit new and probably MIRVed missiles to the force is expected to start in the late 1970s, and to continue through the mid-1980s.

Nuclear War


The Soviets continue to believe that a war with the West will probably evolve into a short nuclear conflict, but they also see some increasing likelihood that a war could begin, and perhaps even remain, at a conventional level. Soviet doctrine calls for the earliest possible destruction of enemy nuclear capabilities, including naval, in the early phases of a conventional conflict.

Because the Soviets think it unlikely that a war with the West would remain conventional, we believe that they would seek to destroy SSBNs in the early stages of a conflict. However, it is possible, if the Soviets saw the opportunity to contain the conflict at conventional levels and given the low probability that they could actually destroy an SSBN, that the Soviet leadership would direct the Navy to refrain from attacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation.

Soviet capabilities for combating Western carrier strike forces--to them a first priority task--include forces for the surveillance of NATO carrier task forces in peacetime, and a combination of air, submarine and surface forces for the destruction of those NATO carrier task forces in war.

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US and Soviet Aircraft Carriers Compared



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We believe that, given time to coordinate all of their surveillance assets, the Soviets would probably be able to locate and track most US aircraft carriers in the northeastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, northwestern Pacific Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean. We believe that coordinated strikes against Western carriers in these areas would be at least partially successful.

The degree of success would depend upon the location of the carriers, whether the Soviets use conventional or nuclear weapons, and whether surprise were achieved. If nuclear weapons were used in a surprise attack, most of the carriers in these areas could be destroyed. On the other hand, timely warning of a Soviet attack would allow the carriers to take action which would probably assure the survival of some carriers, especially against a conventional attack.

We expect the Soviets to maintain the high priority on combating enemy aircraft carrier task forces.

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Strike Capability

The strike capability of the Soviet Navy against Western surface forces will be significantly improved by the deployment with Soviet Naval Aviation of the Backfire ASM strike aircraft. The Backfire's increased range capability will give it coverage over all the major sea lanes leading to Europe and extend Pacific Ocean coverage to Hawaii--areas that were formerly out of range of the strike aircraft of the Soviet Navy.

Equally important, Backfire's capability for high-subsonic, low-level flight will also give it a better chance than the Badger of successfully crossing potentially hostile land areas such as Turkey and Greece in order to operate over the Mediterranean, an area over which, in practical terms, the Soviets could not now operate their naval strike aircraft.

The Backfire's variable-flight profile and high-speed capabilities--Mach 2 at high altitudes--will give it a higher probability of penetrating carrier defenses in the open ocean than is the case with the Badger aircraft.

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Soviet capabilities for anti-submarine warfare (ASW)--countering Western SSBNs and defending against attacks from Western general purpose submarines--are inadequate. We expect the Soviets to continue to pursue various approaches to anti-submarine warfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBN problem. Improved ASW sensors and supporting systems and stand-off weapons will be more extensively deployed. The construction rate of ASW submarines probably will increase.

Although we believe the Soviets in wartime would attempt to attack Western SSBNs, they have no effective capability to do so in the open ocean and will probably not acquire such a capability during the next decade.

The Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency believe that several of the nonacoustic methods currently known to be under investigation by the Soviets offer potential for improving their detection of nuclear submarines and thus could provide them with a capability to threaten the survivability of a portion of the US SSBN force deployed in the open ocean. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, shares this view.

We cannot exclude, however, the possibility that the Soviets might be able to detect a few SSBNs in limited areas such as the western approach to the Barents Sea or in strategic choke points such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. We do not expect that Soviet forces will have systems for the reliable detection of Western attack submarines beyond the range of the latter's weapon systems during the period of this estimate.

We believe that, if a conventional war in Europe were to continue for some time, the Soviets would probably mount an interdiction campaign against Western sea lines of communications. The Soviets would have major problems in doing so.

They do not have forward bases for resupply, and attempts to operate their small number of resupply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters could be easily countered. Thus their submarines would almost certainly have to return through choke points to an uncertain resupply situation.

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Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are basically beyond the range of all but Bear and Backfire aircraft. In a prolonged conventional conflict, therefore, the Soviets could effect attrition on NATO shipping, but could not disrupt it completely. We believe it unlikely that, outside of direct involvement in a war with the West, the USSR would attack Western sea lines of communication, however vulnerable.

We do not believe the Soviets are building naval forces for intervention in distant areas against substantial opposition nor do we believe they have much capability for such intervention now. Soviet ability to sustain combat at sea for long periods would be severely circumscribed by logistics-related weaknesses.

Most of the new larger Soviet surface combatants have no reloads for their major offensive weapons systems, and the ships' limited underway replenishment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sustained combat at sea. The current forward posture of the Soviet Navy depends upon the support of auxiliaries and merchant ships in anchorages and in Third World ports, and presumes a non-hostile environment.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy has diversified its areas of operation. However, the rapid growth rate in naval activity away from home waters that characterized the late 1960s has slowed in the 1970s. Virtually the only increase in the last four years has been related to unusual circumstances such as minesweeping operations in 1974 in the Gulf of Suez and the Bangladesh harbor-clearing operations in 1971.

We believe that the majority of the Soviet out-of-area operations, especially those in the Norwegian Sea and the Pacific Ocean, have been related primarily to training for operations against Western navies. But we also believe that many of the Soviet out-of-area operations reflect a Soviet decision to use naval forces more extensively in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives in peacetime.

Policy Objectives

Through their naval operations in peacetime the Soviet leadership has sought to influence US

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actions at some cost and risk while at the same time keeping to a minimum the chances of actual US-Soviet conflict. We expect this approach to continue.

We believe that the level of Soviet naval out-of-area activity is approaching practical limits, given the USSR's current priorities. Over the longer term, as newer more capable ships enter the force, there will be a moderate but steady increase in the number of ships available for distant operations. Any rapid increase in sustained distant deployment probably would require a more intensive shipbuilding effort, not only of surface combatants, but also of logistic support ships.

Naval activity and port visits, particularly in the Third World, probably have improved the Soviet Union's position with some foreign political leaders, but it has irritated others. Still others--perhaps a majority of Third World leaders--show little outward concern about Soviet naval deployments.

In many countries, nevertheless, especially developed countries with a maritime tradition, naval activity is perceived as an important element in the international political balance. As long as this view continues to be prominent, the Soviet Navy's peacetime operations will have significant political impact.

We believe that future Soviet naval developments will bear a strong resemblance to the current trends. The Soviet Navy has been widely perceived as equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despite the many asymmetries in the two forces. This perception has given the Soviet Navy a degree of credibility which, while not always fully supported by its combat capabilities, has made it an important element in calculations of international political power.

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